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Introduction
Homomorphic encryption (HE) is a cryptographic primitive supporting the additional property in comparison with ordinary encryption: HE allows computing over encrypted data. Let's explain what this means. We assume that plaintexts space P and ciphertexts space C are rings with operations , 
,
.
So the result of computations over ciphertexts will be an encryption of computations result over underlying plaintexts.
Homomorphic cryptosystems (HC) are of key importance for protecting sensitive data in clouds. Computationally weak clients may outsource computations over their data while keeping this data in secret. This makes the development of new homomorphic cryptosystems and cryptanalysis of existing a hot topic. By the present moment a variety of homomorphic cryptosystems were proposed (for example see [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] ). RSA [1] is one of the most well known, because the product of RSA ciphertexts is an encryption of corresponding plaintexts product. But cryptosystems [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] are partially homomorphic, because they allow to compute over ciphertexts only functions lying in some bounded class. In particular for [1] only property (2) holds (multiplicatively homomorphic cryptosystems). Whereas for instance for [2] only (1) holds (additively homomorphic).
The simplest example of HC holding both (1), (2) was introduced in the fundamental paper [6] [7] such encryption was shown to be unsecure against known plaintext attack (KPA). Beginning with [6] lots of cryptosystems with properties (1), (2) were suggested. Here two the most important groups may be highlighted. In the first group there are cryptosystems [8] [9] [10] [11] with unlimited ciphertexts sizes growth during computing over them (their security analysis may be founded in [12, 13] ). Whereas cryptosystems of second group have some polynomially bounds on ciphertexts sizes growth. In this group for example there are cryptosystems [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] belonging to direction initiated by innovative work [14] of IBM researcher Craig Gentry. Second group obviously is more interesting for practice. But unfortunately existing cryptosystems are not enough efficient for usage in real applications. The development of Gentry-like HCs now has mostly theoretical character. And in practice at the present moment HCs from the first group are used. For instance cryptosystems [10, 11] proposed by Domingo-Ferrer are exploited in secure packet forwarding in mobile ad hoc networks (see [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] ). The main reason is a conceptual simplicity of constructions from [10, 11] . In the light of this the analysis of Domingo-Ferrer HCs resistance to different attacks is of value. Here we will concentrate on KPA. In [25] the authors described KPA on [10] and showed that to recover secret key an adversary  should
, where d is a degree of polynomials representing ciphertext. The aim of the present work to demonstrate that [10] may be broken using even two pairs (plaintext, ciphertext). We give some theoretical reasoning to this fact. And also we provide an experimental confirmation.
Denotations
All logarithms are base-2. A probability of event M is denoted by Pr( ) M , ring of integers -by  , ring of integers modulo n -by n  , the multiplicative subgroup of
 . An adversary trying to break cryptosystem will be denoted by  . For symmetric cryptosystem  : P -plaintexts space, C -ciphertexts space, K -secret keys space,  -probabilistic distribution over P . We denote by $ x R   a random element sampled according to uniform distribution over ring R and also by x R    -random ring element generated according distribution  over R . Denotation
means that all coefficients of polynomial f are random values chosen uniformly and independently from R .
Overview of Domingo-Ferrer cryptosystem
Let's briefly recall cryptosystem from [10] . The author sets One may see that '(1)(mod ) a a n
. In [10] the author suggested two regimes of cryptosystem working. In the first variant modulus n is public and plaintexts and ciphertexts coefficients are treated by untrusted party as elements of n  . In the second case n is hidden for providing 
One may see that multiplication of ciphertexts causes an unbounded growth of their sizes (the size is doubled). So in general this HC isn't good for practice. But its simplicity makes it good for applications requiring only computations of some special functions (see [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] should be chosen to obtain 6 10 S  bits. Such setting seems reasonable because in all latest HCs [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] S is usually about 6 10 bits. Larger value of S will make homomorphic computations too much expensive. But of course it is suitable only if additive homomorphism is necessary. But if multiplicative homomorphism will be exploited then d should be smaller.
Cryptanalysis of Domingo-Ferrer cryptosystem

Existing KPA
Here we briefly discuss existing results [25] concerning known plaintexts analysis of Domingo-Ferrer cryptosystem [10] .
Let's suppose  has t pairs ( , ), 1 , 
And please note that
So KPA should proceed in three steps:
  recovers secret modulus p and sets
Recovering of modulus p
For computing p in [25] the authors propose to consider the following matrix 
According to (3) homogeneous system of linear equations ( | )
A 0 has a nontrivial solution modulo p : 
Recovering of
where , , .
( ) :
: mod
holds, where 
, the authors of [25] give an estimation Based on this corollary we have 
90
Summarizing all said above we see that KPA proposed in [25] 
 is proved only for uniform  . The total asymptotical complexity of KPA is
Our improvement of KPA
Now we discuss how to reduce the number of pairs t necessary for successful KPA on cryptosystem [10] . First we recall the notion of resultant for two polynomials.
Let there are 
The resultant of polynomials
is defined as follows:
It is well known result that 0   if and only if ( ) f x and ( ) g x have at least one common root or factor modulo n (for details see [27] ). For further discussion we need the following simple statements.
Statement 4 . If for
have at least one common root or factor modulo p (or q ) then 0
We skip the proof because this statements may be immediately derived from Chinese reminder theorem and congruences properties. Let's return to KPA on cryptosystem [10] . Now we will demonstrate that interception only of two pairs (plaintext, ciphertext) may be enough to recover factorization of n and ( , ) p q k r r  . 
Recovering of modulus
Finally we would like to note that the idea to compute resultant of polynomials for recovering p we borrow from [29] . In [29] the author presented KPA on another Doming-Ferrer homomorphic cryptosystem [11] . Encryption in [11] works similar to [10] . Plaintext ' n a   first is mapped into random polynomial
* n r   -secret key, n -big integer ( log( ) 1000 n  ) with many small divisors, ' | n n and log( ') 100 n  . Modulus ' n is hidden and n is public. It should be pointed out that in spite of similarity construction from [10] is not a special case of [11] and vice versa.
To break cryptosystem [11]  first should compute 
Conclusion
We have analysed the existing method [25] of known plaintext cryptanalysis of Domingo-Ferrer homomorphic cryptosystem [10] . This analysis shows that it provably works with overwhelming probability only for uniform probabilistic distribution  over plaintexts space. The case of arbitrary  requires the further study. Also based on results obtained in [29] we slightly modified KPA from [25] . The obtained KPA works successful even for the number t of intercepted pairs (plaintext, ciphertext) equal to 2 . This is in contrast to [25] where 1 t d   must be satisfied. But unfortunately our attack also provably recovers secret parameters with probability 1  only for uniform  . And the case of arbitrary  also should be studied additionally. If  is such that Pr(0) 1  than both attack fails with probability close to 1. In future we are planning to investigate the resistance of Domingo-Ferrer homomorphic cryptosystem to ciphertext only attack. Аннотация. Данная работа посвящена криптоанализу по известным открытым текстам гомоморфной криптосистемы, предложенной Доминго-Феррером. В предыдущих работах было показано, что для раскрытия секретного ключа необходимо перехватить по меньшей мере 1 d  пару (открытый текст, шифртекст), где d -степень полиномов, являющихся шифртекстами. Здесь мы проводим анализ существующей атаки по известным открытым текстам, а также показываем, как можно её модифицировать так, чтобы значительно уменьшить нужное количество перехваченных пар. А именно, оказывается, что достаточно всего лишь двух пар для раскрытия секретного ключа. Время работы предложенной атаки так же, как и для уже существующей, зависит полиномиально от d и логарифмически от размера пространства открытых текстов. Представлены результаты компьютерных экспериментов.
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